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The financial crisis revealed that shortcomings in corporate gov-
ernance of listed companies were a contributory cause. The
European legislature means to remedy this. Increased engagement
and control by shareholders could contribute to good decision-
making by companies. On 14 March 2017 the European Parliament
voted on the revised Shareholders’ Rights Directive (SRD). The
Council adopted the amended SRD on 22 March 2017. Article 1 of
Directive 2007/36/EC is amended to ‘establish (…) specific
requirements in order to encourage shareholder engagement, in
particular in the long term’. In short, long-term commitment to
companies instead of short-termism.
1. CONTRIBUTING TO LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY
OF EU COMPANIES
The new rules aim to contribute to the long-term sustainability of EU
companies by establishing rules for the ‘identification of shareholders,
transmission of information, facilitation of exercise of shareholders
rights, transparency of institutional investors, asset managers and
proxy advisors, remuneration of directors and related party transac-
tions’. The SRD will facilitate cross-border voting rules which will
make it easier for shareholders to exercise their rights. This will con-
tribute to stronger shareholders’ rights. The company on the other
hand gains insight into their identity thanks to Article 3a: ‘Member
States shall ensure that companies have the right to identify their
shareholders’.
2. SHAREHOLDERS’ ‘SAY ON PAY’
The SRD also lays down certain requirements with regard to
directors’ remuneration. In short, we could say that the provisions
concerning remuneration serve two goals: enhancing the pay gov-
ernance of listed companies, and increasing transparency and
accountability of directors. To align the interests of the company
and its directors, shareholders should have an effective say on pay.
Therefore, the SRD requires Member States to ensure that share-
holders have a binding vote on remuneration policy so that com-
panies are obliged to award their directors remuneration in
accordance with the approved policy. This enhanced position of
shareholders is somewhat weakened by the following derogations.
Member States may provide for the shareholders’ vote to be advi-
sory. If the General Meeting rejects a proposed remuneration policy,
the company will have to submit a revised policy to a vote at the
following General Meeting. Furthermore, Member States may allow
companies, in exceptional circumstances and under specific condi-
tions, to temporarily derogate from the remuneration policy if this
‘is necessary to serve the long-term interests and sustainability of the
company as a whole or to assure its viability’. In order to make sure
that the implementation of the remuneration policy is in line with
the approved policy, Member States should ensure that shareholders
have the right to vote on the remuneration report. In the event the
shareholders vote against this report, companies should explain, in a
subsequent report, in what manner this vote was taken into account.
Besides these provisions focused on enhancing the pay governance
of listed companies, the SRD provides for provisions concerning the
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should enable shareholders to perform their monitoring tasks and
increase the accountability of directors towards shareholders and
stakeholders. Companies, for instance, are required to come up with a
clear and understandable remuneration policy that describes the
different components of directors’ pay. The remuneration policy shall
also explain in what manner the pay and employment conditions of
employees of the company were taken into account when establishing
the aforementioned policy. The remuneration report should, mutatis
mutandis, provide a comprehensive overview of the remuneration
awarded, including all benefits in whatever form. This increased
transparency on (awarded) remuneration should enhance share-
holder monitoring on the link between remuneration and
performance.
3. ENCOURAGING LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
To solve the problem that shareholders today often focus on
short-term strategies, the amended Directive additionally creates
transparency on the engagement policies of institutional inves-
tors and asset managers and on the activities of proxy advisors.
The requirements focus on institutional investors (pension funds,
insurance companies) and asset managers because they play a key
role in the European economy and their business models do not
‘allow them to take into account long-term performance and put
(…) pressure on them to deliver short-term returns’.
4. TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS
Institutional investors and asset managers will also have to be
transparent about how they invest and how they engage with the
investee companies. These transparency requirements will encou-
rage these investors to adopt more-long-term focus on the invest-
ment strategies and to consider social and environmental issues. The
‘comply or explain’ approach to this requirement which is also used
in corporate governance codes, applies. The revised Dutch
Corporate Governance code entails similar requirements for direc-
tors to encourage long-term value creation. However, the imple-
mentation of the Directive will result in statutory requirements
instead of soft law.
Since the revised SRD was adopted on 22 March 2017, Member
States will have 24 months from this date to implement the new
rules.
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